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Dismissing the Foster Children
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S MISAPPLICATION AND
IMPROPER EXPANSION OF THE YOUNGER
ABSTENTION DOCTRINE IN BONNIE L. V. BUSH
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 2000, a class action suit was filed on behalf of
all children statewide in the custody of Florida's child welfare
system.' The suit alleged that the governor of Florida, the
secretary of Florida's Department of Children and Families,
and administrators of the state's foster care system violated the
plaintiffs' constitutional and federal statutory rights by
maintaining a foster care system riddled with "widespread
deficiencies."' Specific allegations against the defendants
© 2004 Nora Meltzer. All Rights Reserved.
Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2001),
rev'd sub nom. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
Reggie B. v. Bush, 540 U.S. 984 (Nov. 3, 2003).
2 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003). The
amended complaint contains six counts, alleging that the defendants' practices deny
and threaten the plaintiffs' claimed rights to:
(1) safe care that meets their basic needs, prompt placements with
permanent families, and services extended after their eighteenth birthdays,
as guaranteed by substantive due process (Count I); (2) procedural due
process in determining the services they will receive (Count II); (3) family
association with siblings as guaranteed by the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments (Count III); (4) prompt placement with permanent families and
to have their medical and educational backgrounds provided to their
caregivers, as guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. §§ 675(5)(D) and (E), which are
provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500, 516 (June 17, 1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 620-628 and §§ 670-679a ("the Adoption Act") (Count IV); (5) health
screening and follow-up under schedules established pursuant to the
Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43)(B), 1396a(a)(43)(C), and 1396(r)
(Count V); and (6) in the case of the black plaintiff foster children, freedom
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included claims that the child welfare agency engaged in a
"pattern and practice" of placing children in "dangerous,
abusive, neglectful, overcrowded or inappropriate" foster care
settings; failed to "screen, oversee, monitor, and visit" foster
homes; and ignored complaints of abuse or neglect in foster
homes.'
Despite the pressing need for reform of Florida's
Department of Children and Families (DCF or the
Department), the suit's constitutional claims-violations of
substantive due process and the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments-were dismissed' on the basis of Younger
abstention,5 a doctrine developed in the 1971 case of Younger v.
Harris.' The doctrine provides that federal courts should
abstain from adjudicating a case, over which the federal court
otherwise has proper jurisdiction, when the relief sought in
federal court would interfere with an ongoing state court
proceeding and when the litigant has an adequate opportunity
to raise his constitutional claims in the ongoing state
proceeding.7 The federal court in Bonnie L. v. Bush determined
that an order of injunctive relief from federal court directed at
improving Florida's foster care system "ha[d] the potential for
an unseemly conflict between a state judge and [itselfl. "s On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal on Younger
from racial discrimination in the provision of care and services, as
guaranteed by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Count VI).
Id. at 1261.
' See Plaintiffs Amended Complaint IT 140-43, Bonnie L. v. Bush (S.D. Fla.
2001) (No. 00-2116) available at http://childrensrights.orgPDF/legal/florida-complaint.
pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2004). This online copy of the amended complaint is linked to
the website of Children's Rights, Inc., the national children's advocacy organization
that represented plaintiffs in Bonnie L.
Bonnie L. v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
Id. at 1338. In addition to abstention grounds, the District Court dismissed
the case also on grounds of Eleventh Amendment Immunity and lack of private right of
enforcement, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act.
See id. at 1331, 1344.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423,
432 (1982) (holding that the federal court properly abstained from hearing litigant's
federal constitutional challenge seeking to enjoin a pending state bar disciplinary
proceeding because of the important state interest in the pending state proceeding and
because the litigant had opportunity to raise his claim in the state proceeding).
' Bonnie L., 180 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
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abstention grounds,9 agreeing that the federal lawsuit would
interfere with juvenile court proceedings in the state court
system in which foster children are regularly involved.' °
Disregarding the merits of the claim and the critical need for
the sought-after reform, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that the
plaintiffs could, and therefore should, raise their constitutional
claims in the state's juvenile system." Even with what the
Supreme Court has characterized as the federal courts'
"virtually unflagging obligation.., to exercise the jurisdiction
given them," 2 the Eleventh Circuit declined to exercise
jurisdiction and ignored its duty to protect and enforce the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
This Note challenges the Eleventh Circuit's decision to
dismiss the case of Bonnie L. v. Bush on grounds of Younger
abstention." Part II of this Note begins with a brief description
of Florida's child welfare system, highlighting the system's
deficiencies and outlining the improvements sought by the
plaintiffs in Bonnie L. Part III sketches the evolution of the
Younger abstention doctrine, the expansion of the doctrine over
the last twenty years, and the current standard in applying
Younger abstention. Part IV then closely examines the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bonnie L. v. Bush, arguing that
the court's decision relies on an unwarranted expansion and
incorrect application of the Younger abstention doctrine. Part
V asserts that federal courts have an obligation to exercise
their proper jurisdiction to protect the constitutional rights of
foster children. This section also proposes that federal courts
are the only viable forum in which remedial schemes to
improve Florida's child welfare system can be accomplished.
And finally, this Note ends with a plea to federal courts to live
up to their responsibility to protect the rights of U.S. citizens,
31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1282.
10 Id. at 1278. State juvenile courts are required to conduct periodic review
proceedings for every child in state custody, generally once every 6 months. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ch. 39.701(1)(a) (2003). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit did not address the
issue of dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment Immunity because the Circuit Court
dismissed on abstention grounds and lack of enforceable right. See 31 Foster Children,
329 F.3d at 1268 (citation omitted).
1' 31 Foster Children, 329 F. 3d at 1279-80.
12 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976) (involving dismissal of a suit brought in federal court by the United States
on its behalf and on behalf of two Indian tribes seeking declaratory judgment of rights
over water and tributaries of the Colorado River).
13 Note that on appeal, the name of the case was changed from Bonnie L. v.
Bush to 31 Foster Children v. Bush. Throughout this note, however, I will refer to the
Eleventh Circuit case as "Bonnie L." despite the case name modification.
2004-05]
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especially ones as vulnerable as foster children, in the hopes
that child welfare institutions in this country can be effectively
reformed before any more children are unnecessarily harmed
or killed.
II. THE FAILURE OF FLORIDA'S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
AND THE FILING OF BONNIE L. V. BUSH
Child welfare systems are created to protect children
who cannot be adequately cared for by their biological
families.'4  These systems remove abused and neglected
children from their parents' custody and place them in the
custody of the state. 5 The state, in turn, has a constitutional
obligation to provide adequate care for these children." The
state must provide them with services and make efforts either
to return them to the custody of their biological families, or to
facilitate the adoption process with an alternative family. 7
The Florida system, like many large child welfare
systems across the country, has failed its children.'8 From July
14 See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-629, 670-
679 (codified as amended by the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-89 (1997) [hereinafter ASFA]).
" See, e.g., FLA. STAT. chs. 409, 39 (2003) (the two chapters of the Florida
statutes which govern the obligations of the state in providing a child welfare system).
The Federal Government provides federal grants to states, and states are required to
create a state department to provide foster care and foster services in compliance with
federal law.
" See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 312, 322 (1982) (finding that a
mental patient involuntarily committed to a state institution had a constitutionally
protected liberty interest under the Due Process clause to reasonably safe conditions of
confinement); Taylor By and Through Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir.
1987) (in § 1983 action brought by foster child against state child welfare system for
injuries suffered while in custody of foster parents, the court stated that "the state's
action in assuming the responsibility of finding and keeping the child in a safe
environment placed an obligation on the state to insure the continuing safety of that
environment."); see also Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 201 n.9 (1989) (noting that foster care may be "sufficiently analogous" to
institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect children in custody).
17 See ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89 §§ 101, 103, 308 (1997).
See Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Justice for Abused Foster Children: Suing State
Agencies as Third Parties Under the Civil Rights Act Can Provide Relief for Children
Placed in Harmful Circumstances, TRIAL, Oct. 2003, at 42; Tim Padgett, Is Florida Bad
for Kids? Another tragedy-the killing of a 2-year-old-stokes the furor over the state's
broken child-welfare system, TIME, July 22, 2002, at 27; U.S Department of Health and
Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Child Welfare Outcomes
2000: Annual Report, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/
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2000 to July 2001, ninety-five children died of abuse or neglect
after the Department began an investigation into each child's
circumstances. 9 In the following year, there were eighty-seven
to ninety such deaths.2' Nonetheless, it was only after the
disappearance of 5-year old foster child, Rilya Wilson, that
Florida's troubled system received national attention.2' In that
case, state caseworkers became aware that the young girl was
missing in April 2002, at which point she had been missing,
wholly unbeknownst to the agency, for over fifteen months.22
The severe shortcomings of Florida's Department of
Children and Families are undisputed. In August 2003, the
federal government conducted the first Child and Family
Service Review, a test created to measure a state's "ability to
protect children from child abuse and to find permanent homes
for kids who often languish in foster care."23 The review covered
seven categories. Florida's system failed six of those seven
categories, displaying the Department's inadequacies in each of
the following areas: protecting children from abuse and neglect;
maintaining children in the home as opposed to placing them
in foster care when possible and appropriate; providing
permanency and stability in children's living situations;
supporting families' ability to provide for children's needs;
cwo00/index.htm (assessment of state efforts to provide safety and permanency for
children in state custody), with data for the state of Florida available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/cwo0O/statedata/fl.htm. See also Mark
Hollis & Shana Gruskin, Year of Reform at DCF Leaves Goals Unmet: Agency chief sees
mixed results, more work ahead, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN SENTINEL, Sep. 17, 2003, at 1B (a
year after efforts began to reform Florida's troubled child welfare system, it "continues
to fail many of the 49,000 children in the state's care"); Douglas Kalajian, Sharing the
Shame, PALM BEACH POST, Sep. 19, 2002, at 1E (comparing Florida's child welfare
system to those of other states and concluding that Florida's failings are the norm
across the country). For discussion of the failures of other state child welfare systems,
see, e.g., David Van Biema, Abandoned to her Fate: Neighbors, teachers and the
authorities all knew Elisa Izquierdo was being abused. But somehow nobody managed
to stop it, TIME, Dec. 11, 1995, at 32; Leslie Kaufman & Richard Lezin Jones, Misplaced
Trust: Child Welfare in Crisis; Cradle to Grave in Flawed New Jersey Foster Care, N.Y.
TIMES, April 6, 2003, at Al.
" Hollis & Gruskin, supra note 18.
20 Id.
1 See, e.g., Dana Canedy, Case of Lost Miami Girl Puts Focus on Agency,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2002, at A19.
22 Diana Marrero, Missing Birthday Girl Rilya Turns 7; State Senator Calls
For More Responsive State Program For Children, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale,
Fl.), Sep. 30, 2003, at lB.
" Laura Meckler, No States Pass Rigorous U.S. Test to Halt Child Abuse,




ensuring children's educational needs are met; and securing
the physical and mental well-being of children. 4
In response to the failure of Florida's child welfare
system, and in the hopes of protecting thousands of abused and
neglected children in the state of Florida's care, Bonnie L. v.
Bush25 was filed in federal district court in the Southern
District of Florida. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §
198326 and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to improve
the embattled system. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought to
have the court declare unconstitutional and unlawful various
practices of Florida's Department of Children and Families; to
enjoin DCF and the other defendants from violating the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights; to order appropriate remedial
relief in compliance with the Constitution and federal laws; to
appoint a panel of child welfare experts to "develop and oversee
the implementation of a plan for reform"; and finally, to
appoint an ombudsman or child advocate to meet with the
defendants regularly and advocate on behalf of children in the
281system.
Avoiding the merits of the Bonnie L. complaint, both the
District Court and the Eleventh Circuit improperly abstained
from entertaining the case altogether.29 Under the doctrine of
' Id. The only category Florida passed was in preservation of continuous
family relationships and connections.
Bonnie L. v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
" Id. at 1325. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
27 id.
' See 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2003).
The alleged unconstitutional and unlawful practices of DCF and the defendants
included, among others, the following: failure to provide for the plaintiffs' basic needs,
safety, freedom from harm, freedom from unreasonable restraints on liberty, freedom
from being placed into unnecessary state-created danger, and freedom from arbitrary
and capricious actions and decisions that deprive plaintiffs of benefits to which they
are entitled; deprivation of state-created entitlements without an adequate and fair
procedure; and unnecessary separation of siblings and denial of visitation among them.
Id. at 1261.
2 Bonnie L., 180 F. Supp. 2d at 1326; 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1282.
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Younger abstention, federal courts are permitted to abstain
only when the federal suit and the relief sought would interfere
with an ongoing state proceeding and there is a sufficient
opportunity for the litigant to raise his constitutional claims in
the state proceeding at issue.0 In the case of Bonnie L., the
relief sought would not have affected state court proceedings in
any manner that would have run afoul of the Younger doctrine.
The injunctive relief sought in Bonnie L. was aimed at
improving Florida's Department of Children and Families to
make the agency live up to its constitutional obligations to
protect Florida's abused and neglected children."' Contrary to
the court's determination, such system-wide reformation of
Florida's foster care system in no way interferes with the
juvenile court dependency proceedings of Florida's foster
children.32 The Eleventh Circuit was only able to justify its
dismissal of Bonnie L. by incorrectly and inappropriately
expanding the scope of interference upon which Younger
abstention jurisprudence has always been based. Furthermore,
the juvenile courts of Florida do not provide an adequate forum
for the plaintiff children in Bonnie L. to raise their
constitutional claims.3  Indeed, procedural and practical
barriers to bringing a statewide class action, institutional
reform case such as Bonnie L. in juvenile court dictate that
abstention was not warranted.'
Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432.
3 31 Foster Children, 328 F.3d at 1261-62.
32 Cf. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 286 (N.D. Ga. 2003)
(finding that reform of child welfare system analogous to reform sought in Bonnie L.
did not interfere with dependency proceedings and further could only have helped the
juvenile court proceedings by relieving stresses on caseworkers so that they could
better represent children's interests).
See FLA. R. JuV. P. 8.000-8.735. (containing no provision for class actions
suits).
. See Dep't of Children and Family Servs. v. I.C., 742 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (State courts conducting periodic reviews of foster children have
"no general jurisdiction over [the Department of Children and Family Services] to
monitor and evaluate its functioning."); See also LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990
F.2d 1319, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that juvenile court proceedings did not
provide an adequate forum for plaintiff class of foster children "to present its
multifaceted request for broad-based injunctive relief based on the Constitution and on
federal and local statutory law").
2004-051
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III. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE YOUNGER ABSTENTION
DOCTRINE
A. Background
In the case of Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court
developed the abstention doctrine which came to be known as
Younger abstention." In defining the doctrine, the Court relied
on notions of comity, equity, and federalism.36 The basic
principle articulated in Younger was that a federal court
cannot enjoin a pending state court proceeding absent
extraordinary circumstances.37 Although Younger is considered
the first explicit declaration of this doctrine, it is based on an
ideal born long before the historic 1971 case. 38
The foundation of the abstention principle came from
English law, where it was impermissible for courts of equity to
interfere with criminal proceedings.39 In 1888, the United
States Supreme Court refused to intrude in a forthcoming
criminal proceeding in the case of In re Sawyer." In that case,
the Court determined, based on long-standing principles of
English jurisprudence, that a court of equity "has no
jurisdiction over the prosecution, the punishment, or the
pardon of crimes or misdemeanors, or over the appointment
and removal of public officers."1 To intervene in criminal
matters, the Court said, would be to "invade the domain of the
courts of common law.. . ." The Sawyer decision also cited the
Anti-Injunction Act43 as a basis for non-intervention." Passed
in 1793, the Anti-Injunction Act instructs that no United
States Court has authority to grant an injunction of state court
proceedings "except as authorized by an act of Congress or
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
31 Id. at 43-44.
, Id. at 45.
See Matthew D. Staver, Balancing Federal Court Intervention with State
Sovereignty, 22 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 1143, 1156 (1997).
39 Id.
'0 In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888).
41 Id. at 210.
42 id.
13 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1997).
Sawyer, 124 U.S. at 219-20.
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where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.'S The foundation of the Anti-
Injunction Act, like the decision in Sawyer, concerns the
relationship between federal and state court, and the tensions
therein.46 The case of Younger v. Harris raised those same
concerns.
B. Younger v. Harris
The plaintiff in Younger v. Harris, John Harris, was
indicted in California state court under California's Criminal
Syndicalism Act for distributing political pamphlets.47
Following his indictment and unsuccessful attempts in the
California trial and appellate courts to have the case dismissed,
Harris filed suit in federal district court, seeking an injunction
to enjoin the Los Angeles County District Attorney, Evelle
Younger, from further prosecution." Harris alleged that the
Syndicalism Act violated his constitutional rights guaranteed
to him by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal
Constitution. The District Court for the Central District of
California granted the injunction enjoining further prosecution
and held that California's Act was void for vagueness and
overbreadth. 9 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
lower court decision "must be reversed as a violation of the
national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin
pending state court proceedings except under special
circumstances."' In its decision, the Supreme Court outlined
the "precise reasons" for the "longstanding" federal non-
intervention policy.51 The first reason the Court cited was that
courts of equity, under the "basic doctrine of equity
jurisprudence," ought not restrain criminal prosecutions when
the complainant has an adequate remedy at law and will not
Id. In Mitchum v. Foster, the Supreme Court held that civil rights actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were exempt from the Anti-Injunction Act because
Congress explicitly provided in § 1983 for federal courts to have authority to issue
injunctive relief. 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972).
' See Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9
(1940) (noting that the intent of the Anti-Injunction Act was to avoid "needless friction
between state and federal courts").
47 Younger, 401 U.S. at 38.
Id. at 38-39.
49 Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
Younger, 401 U.S. at 41.
" Id. at 43.
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suffer irreparable harm from denial of equitable relief. 2 The
opinion continues:
This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from
interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more
vital consideration, the notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for
state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best
if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways.53
The Court referred to this second principle as "Our
Federalism."' Our Federalism, as a concept, the Court
explained, "does not mean blind deference to 'States' Rights,"'
but rather a system which is sensitive to "the legitimate
interests of both State and National Governments."5
In applying the principles of equity, comity, and
federalism to Harris's case, the Supreme Court found
abstention proper.56 Harris had a pending proceeding in state
court in which he was afforded the opportunity to raise his
constitutional claims.57 Moreover, the Court determined that
Harris's prosecution was not brought in bad faith; the only
injury facing Harris was "solely 'that incidental to every
criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith.'" 8
Thus, Harris's case did not give rise to exceptional
circumstances warranting federal intervention.5
With this ruling, Younger abstention was born. At its
creation, the doctrine was relatively restricted: it forbade a
federal court from enjoining a pending state criminal
proceeding unless the complainant was not afforded an
adequate remedy at law or he would be immediately and
" Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 44.
rA Id.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
Id. at 53.
'7 Id. at 49.
Id. (quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943)). The
Younger decision continued: "[Tiherefore under the settled doctrine we have already
described he is not entitled to equitable relief 'even if such statutes are
unconstitutional.'" Id. (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941).
" Id. at 53.
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irreparably injured if denied equitable relief.' However, the
doctrine was quickly expanded, further limiting litigants'
access to federal courts to vindicate federal constitutional
rights.
61
C. Expansion of the Younger Abstention Doctrine
On the same day the Supreme Court decided Younger, it
also decided Samuels v. Mackell,6" an almost factually
analogous case, in which the plaintiffs sought not only an
injunction against further criminal proceedings, but also
declaratory relief. The plaintiffs in Samuels, indicted under
New York's criminal anarchy statutes, requested the district
court to enter a declaratory judgment stating that the
challenged laws were unconstitutional.63 The Supreme Court
relied on the same principles it did in Younger in determining
that abstention was proper with respect to declaratory relief as
well as injunctive relief.' The opinion states:
[I]n cases where the criminal proceeding was begun prior to the
federal civil suit, the propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief
should be judged by essentially the same standards. In both
situations deeply rooted and long-settled principles of equity have
narrowly restricted the scope for federal intervention, and ordinarily
' Three years after Younger, the Supreme Court held that Younger
abstention was not applicable in cases where there is no state criminal proceeding
pending at the time the federal complaint is filed. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
462 (1974).
6" See, e.g., Donald H. Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine
and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State
Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 267 (1976-77) (stating that "even though the
Younger doctrine as properly understood reflects the sound policy of avoiding
unnecessary federal interference with state proceedings, some courts have extended
the doctrine to situations in which the potential interference is minimal and federal
court action is essential to the vindication of the complainants' constitutional rights.");
Bryce M. Baird, Federal Court Abstention in Civil Rights Cases: Chief Judge Rehnquist
and the New Doctrine of Civil Rights Abstention, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 501 (1994).
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
Id. at 68.
Id. at 72. However, the Court did note that:
There may be unusual circumstances in which an injunction might be
withheld because, despite a plaintiffs strong claim for relief under the
established standards, the injunctive remedy seemed particularly intrusive
or offensive; in such a situation, a declaratory judgment might be appropriate
and might not be contrary to the basic equitable doctrines governing the
availability of relief. Ordinarily, however, the practical effect of the two forms
of relief will be virtually identical, and the basic policy against federal
interference with pending state criminal prosecutions will be frustrated as




a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference
with and disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy
limiting injunctions was designed to avoid.'
The Samuels Court also relied on the Declaratory
Judgment Act to support its decision of non-intervention."6 The
Declaratory Judgment Act provides that a district court, after
issuing a declaratory judgment, may grant "further necessary
or proper relief" based on that judgment. 7 Thus, the court
reasoned, once a declaratory judgment is entered, a subsequent
injunction could follow in order to uphold the declaratory
relief.6" In that situation, the injunction, and thus the
declaratory judgment which preceded it, would interfere with
pending state proceedings and run afoul of Younger abstention
principles.69
Following the extension of Younger's application from
injunctive to declaratory relief, in 1975 the Court further
expanded the doctrine in the case of Huffman v. Pursue . 7' This
case began in state court in Ohio, where prosecutors attempted
to close a movie theater under Ohio's public nuisance statute.7'
The theatre owner lost at the trial level in state court." In lieu
of appealing the decision within the state system, he filed suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in district court seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief based on the claim that Ohio's public
nuisance statute was unconstitutional. " The district court,
without considering Younger abstention, found in favor of the
theatre owner and issued a permanent injunction against
Id. at 72.
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 955 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000)).
28 U.S.C. § 2202 (2000).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
See Samuel, 401 U.S. at 72.
Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
71 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3767.01-3767.99 (1971). The alleged nuisance
violation was based on the theatre's showing of pornographic movies. Under the
statute, any establishment in violation could be closed for up to one year, and any
items determined to be "obscene" could be subject to forced sale. Huffman, 420 U.S. at
595-97.
State ex rel. Huffman v. Dakota, No. 72 CIV 0326 (Ct. Com. Pleas, Allen
County, Ohio, Nov. 30, 1972) (cited in Huffman, 420 U.S. at 598).
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 598.
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closing the theatre. 4 On appeal the Supreme Court addressed
only the Younger abstention issue and dismissed the case."
Although the Younger doctrine would not have applied
in this case" because it was civil in nature and not criminal,77
the Supreme Court expanded the boundaries of the doctrine,
holding that Younger abstention applied and was proper in
Huffman."5 For one, the Court disapproved of the owner's
attempt to bypass the state appellate process.79 It explained
that the theater owner could have continued with an appeal in
the state court system and could have ultimately reached the
U.S. Supreme Court by traveling that road. ° In addition, the
Court reasoned that the nuisance proceeding in Ohio could be
likened to criminal prosecution.81 The critical contribution of
Huffman, therefore, is that Younger abstention was expanded
to apply to civil proceedings which are "both in aid of and
closely related to criminal statutes."' In other words, Younger
abstention was extended to apply to proceedings that are
"quasi-criminal" in nature.'
Then, in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton
Christian School,8 the Younger doctrine was further expanded
to include "quasi-judicial" proceedings.' In Dayton Christian
School, a pregnant teacher's contract at a religious school was
terminated because of a religious policy requiring mothers to
stay home with their young children. In response, the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission began administrative proceedings
'4 Id. at 599.
75 Id.
76 See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 603, 606.
" Id. at 607, 611-12.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 609-10.
8 Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604. The opinion states:
[We deal here with a state proceeding which in important respects is more
akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases. The State is a party
to the Court of Common Pleas proceeding, and the proceeding is both in aid of
and closely related to criminal statutes which prohibit the dissemination of
obscene materials. Thus, an offense to the State's interest in the nuisance
litigation is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal
proceeding.
Id.
2 Id. at 604.
See Staver, supra note 38, at 1169.
Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
See Staver, supra note 38, at 1169.
Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 477 U.S. at 623. When the teacher prepared to
sue, the school rescinded its decision, but then fired the teacher on grounds that she
had violated the school's internal dispute resolution policy. Id.
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against the school based on the teacher's discharge. 7 Seeking
an injunction against the pending administrative process, the
school filed suit in federal district court claiming that any
sanctions imposed would constitute violations of the
Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion clauses of the
First Amendment."' The Supreme Court held that abstention
was proper in this case. 9 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, reasoned that because the administrative proceeding
provided the school the opportunity to raise its constitutional
claims, abstention was appropriate and warranted.' With this
holding, Younger abstention doctrine expanded to also
encompass quasi-judicial proceedings.
The Younger theory has now also been applied to
prohibit federal intervention in more traditional civil
proceedings.9' With this, a shifting analysis in the Younger line
of cases has occurred.92 The origins of Younger abstention, as
we have seen and as the Younger opinion itself decries, lie in
notions of equity, comity, and federalism." As the Younger
doctrine has expanded, however, the analysis has developed
into an inquiry of the sufficiency of the state interest in its
proceedings and, ultimately, has evolved into an analysis of the
adequacy of the state forum.' A brief sketch of the following
cases highlights this evolution.




9' See Staver, supra note 38, at 1170-71; Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977);
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
See, e.g., Penzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
[C]oncern mandates application of Younger abstention not only when the
pending state proceedings are criminal, but also when certain civil
proceedings are pending, if the State's interests in the proceeding are so
important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the
comity between the States and the National Government.
Id.
See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
See, e.g., Baird, supra note 61 (arguing that Rehnquist has played a critical
role in expanding the federalism element of the Younger abstention doctrine beyond
the bounds contemplated by the Younger decision, in abrogation of 28 U.S.C. § 1343,
which grants access to federal courts to civil rights plaintiffs).
[Vol. 70:2
DISMISSING THE FOSTER CHILDREN
In Juidice v. Vail,95 the Supreme Court took an
exceedingly expansive view of the notion of comity and held
that abstention was proper in a case where the pending state
proceeding was civil, but neither quasi-criminal nor quasi-
judicial.96 In this case, the plaintiff, Harry Vail, had disobeyed
subpoenas and was held in contempt by state court judges. 97 He
then brought a class-action suit on behalf of a class of judgment
debtors in federal court, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,98 seeking to
enjoin the use of statutory contempt procedures as
unconstitutional violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The Supreme Court held that Younger abstention was proper
in this case because abstention under Younger was not limited
to state action akin to criminal proceedings.0 ° In its decision,
the Court relied on the language of Huffman and Younger,
noting that "the "'more vital consideration"' behind the Younger
doctrine of nonintervention lay not in the fact that the state
criminal process was involved, but rather in 'the notion of
'comity."""' The opinion emphasized that Younger mandated
deference not only to state judicial proceedings, but also to
state functions, such as the contempt power, which lie "at the
core of the administration of a State judicial system." 2
Labeling the state proceeding as civil, quasi-criminal, or
criminal in nature was not the "salient fact" in Younger
analysis, the Court declared.0 3 Rather, the critical factor was
the federal court interference with the State's interest in
enforcing its contempt power.104
In Juidice v. Vail, the abstention analysis focused on a
state's interest in litigating in its own state judicial system.' 5
Two years later, the Supreme Court again modified the
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
See Baird, supra note 61, at 536.
97 Juidice, 430 U.S. at 328-29. Vail was a judgment debtor who had defaulted
on a credit arrangement, for which a default judgment was entered against him in City
Court of Poughkeepsie, NY. He then disobeyed a subpoena to attend a deposition, and
subsequently failed to appear at a hearing to show cause why he should not be held in




"' Juidice, 430 U.S. at 334 (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 601
(1975) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971))).
'*' Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335.
.. Id. at 335-36.
104 Id.
' Id. at 335.
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Younger analysis..6 in the case of Moore v. Sims."7 There, a
Texas couple's three children were removed from their custody
because of suspected child abuse pursuant to a state court
proceeding. The children were held in state custody for six
weeks without a hearing.' The couple filed a federal suit
challenging the constitutionality of certain statutes of the
Texas Family Code, seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining
any further prosecutions under the statutes at issue.' 9 The
District Court held that abstention was inappropriate in this
case. "  The Supreme Court, however, reversed."' In its
analysis, the Court not only looked to Texas's interest in
litigating this matter in its own courts, but more importantly,
to the fact that the state proceedings provided the federal
plaintiffs the opportunity to raise their constitutional claims." 2
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, wrote:
The price exacted in terms of comity would only be outweighed if
state courts were not competent to adjudicate federal constitutional
claims-a postulate we have repeatedly and emphatically rejected.
In sum, the only pertinent inquiry is whether the state proceedings
afford an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims,
and Texas law appears to raise no procedural barriers.
1 3
The strong language used in this passage, asserting that
the "only pertinent inquiry" is the adequacy of the state forum,
marks a significant shift in the Supreme Court's Younger
abstention analysis. The Moore opinion suggests that the State
interest is secondary, the merits of the claim itself are no
longer even considered, and that the only way comity concerns
will be outweighed in favor of federal courts exercising their
jurisdiction is when the state forum is inadequate."' This
standard is quite disparate from the original foundations of
abstention laid down in Younger v. Harris only eight years
1" See Baird, supra note 61, at 540.
'0' Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
'0' Id. at 419-20.
"' Id. at 421-22.
110 Id. at 422. The decision was also in part based on the fact that the state
litigation was "the product of procedural confusion in the state courts." Id.
. Id. at 423, 435.
"' Moore, 442 U.S. at 430.
113 Id. (internal citation omitted).
114 See Baird, supra note 61, at 540-41.
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earlier. In Younger, the Court explicitly stated that their
holding in that case did "not mean blind deference to 'States'
Rights,'" but only a "sensitivity" to the interests of both the
state and the federal government, and an endeavor on the part
of the federal courts not to interfere when unwarranted.'
15
D. Younger Abstention Today: The Three-Prong Middlesex
Test
The Supreme Court constructed a three-prong standard
for cases implicating Younger abstention in 1982 in the case of
Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar
Association.116 The Middlesex test is recognized as the current
standard for Younger abstention, and is most often
characterized as follows: Younger abstention is proper when (1)
the state action is an ongoing state proceeding (2) that
implicates important state interests, and (3) the plaintiff has
an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in
the state proceeding. 17 Since the establishment of this three-
part standard, however, questions concerning the precise
boundaries of Younger abstention have persisted, and the
Supreme Court has not provided a great deal of guidance in
clarifying the doctrine's exact limits and parameters.1 8
115 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
116 Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982). At issue in this case was the constitutionality of disciplinary rules of a New
Jersey county ethics committee. The federal plaintiff, an attorney who was charged
with violating the New Jersey Code of Professional Conduct, was involved in a
disciplinary proceeding before the Ethics Committee when he filed his federal suit. The
Supreme Court held abstention warranted in this case, relying on the precedent of
Juidice v. Vail and Moore v. Sims. Id. at 432-33, 436.
"' Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432.
The question in this case is threefold: first, do state bar disciplinary hearings
within the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction of the State Supreme Court
constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the proceedings
implicate important state interests; and third, is there an adequate
opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.
Id.
.. See, e.g., Charles R. Wise & Robert K Chistensen, Sorting Out Federal and
State Judicial Roles in State Institutional Reform: Abstention's Potential Role, 29
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 387, 389 (2001) ("The ambiguity surrounding the abstention
doctrine in institutional reform cases hinders the effective reform of state and local
institutions."); Green v. Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001) (characterizing the
abstention doctrine as an "oversimplification" of complex issues, leading to "a tendency
for the district courts, and this court, to lose their way in the maze of various
abstention doctrines, with the consequence that litigants who had properly invoked
federal court jurisdiction are improperly relegated to an exclusive state court remedy
for claimed violations of their federal constitutional rights").
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E. Curtailment of the Younger Doctrine
In order to acquire a full understanding of where
Younger abstention stands today, and thus why it should not
have been applied in the Bonnie L. case, there is one final case
which must be discussed. This case, New Orleans Public
Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, known as
"NOPSI,""9 is significant because in its decision the Supreme
Court limited the extent to which abstention applies in civil
cases. To briefly summarize the complicated facts, the New
Orleans City Council brought suit in state court seeking a
declaration to establish a rate order. NOPSI, a local utility
company, then filed suit in federal court seeking an injunction
against the council and challenging the constitutionality of the
rate order. 2 ' The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing the rulings of
the district court and the Fifth Circuit, held that a federal
court should not abstain when the ongoing state proceeding at
issue involves a state court engaged in an "essentially
legislative act." "'
The NOPSI opinion is essential in analyzing the
Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Bonnie L. NOPSI stresses the
importance of federal courts exercising the jurisdiction granted
to them in protecting and enforcing individuals' rights. The
opinion states: "Our cases have long supported the proposition
that federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the
exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred."'22 While
... New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491
U.S. 350 (1989) [hereinafter NOPSI].
' Id. at 353-58. NOPSI was held liable by the Federal Energy Regulation
Commission (FERC) for costs associated with constructing a nuclear power plant. The
New Orleans City Council denied NOPSI's request for a rate increase to cover the
construction costs, determining that NOPSI has incurred some of the costs through its
own negligence. Id. at 352.
121 Id. at 371.
Id. at 358. To support this statement, the NOPSI opinion cites the
following cases: Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no more right
to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution."); Chicot County v.
Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893) ("[The courts of the United States are bound to
proceed to judgment and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case in which
their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in
favor of another jurisdiction."); Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas. Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909)
("When a federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law
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recognizing that there are certain situations where federal
courts should abstain, the Court stated that it has "carefully
defined" the areas in which abstention is appropriate; the
Court reiterated that abstention remains "'the exception, not
the rule."'123 With this principle in mind, the Court determined
that the rate making at issue in NOPSI was a legislative act,
124
and therefore that Younger abstention was unwarranted
because the challenge was not within the scope of abstention
defined by Younger v. Harris and its progeny.25 Following the
reasoning of the NOPSI decision, and bearing in mind the
origins and evolution of the Younger abstention doctrine
generally, the Eleventh Circuit's decision to abstain in the case
of Bonnie L. is erroneous.
IV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S MISAPPLICATION OF YOUNGER
ABSTENTION IN BONNIE L.
In Bonnie L. v. Bush, the Eleventh Circuit misapplied
the doctrine of Younger abstention, inappropriately extending
it beyond the boundaries proscribed by the Supreme Court. As
precedent, this incorrect decision in favor of abstention could
adversely affect hundreds of thousands of children in foster
care throughout this country. 26
The three-prong Middlesex test, the current standard
for the application of Younger abstention, authorizes federal
abstention in favor of the state proceeding when the following
three conditions are met: (1) the state action is an ongoing
state proceeding (2) that implicates important state interests,
and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to raise his
constitutional claims in the state proceeding."2 In the case of
Bonnie L., both parties conceded that the second prong of the
Middlesex test was met, agreeing that the safety and well-
jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction.... The right of a party plaintiff to
choose a Federal court where there is a choice cannot be properly denied.") (citations
omitted). NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 358-59.
12' NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359 (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 236 (1984) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976))).
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 371.
Id. at 373.
See generally Kubitschek, supra note 18; Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe
Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and
Neglect, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199 (1988) (arguing that foster children require
federal judicial protection for constitutional violations).




being of children in state custody is an important state
interest.1"8 Additionally, both parties also agreed that state
juvenile court dependency proceedings, held periodically for
every child in Florida's custody, constitute an ongoing state
proceeding implicating the first prong of the Middlesex test.
12
1
Thus, the contested issues in Bonnie L. were (1) whether the
federal suit and the relief it sought would interfere with the
state proceedings in juvenile court, and (2) whether the state
dependency proceedings provide the plaintiff children "with an
opportunity to raise and vindicate [their] federal constitutional
claims. . . ."'o The Eleventh Circuit answered both questions
incorrectly.
A. The Ongoing State Court Proceeding: A Foster Child's
Periodic Review in Juvenile Court
As the Eleventh Circuit emphasized in the Bonnie L.
decision, to properly conduct a Middlesex analysis, an
understanding of the features of the ongoing state proceeding
with which there is alleged interference is important.131 Thus to
analyze the abstention issue in Bonnie L., a cursory
understanding of the features of Florida's foster care system is
required.'32 A child in Florida enters the foster care system
when he or she is removed from his or her home and placed
into state custody." Florida's Department of Children and
Families is responsible for conducting, supervising, and
administering a "program for dependent children and their
families" with the following goals: (a) prevention of separation
"' 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) ("The
parties also agree ... that important state interests are involved.").
' Id. at 1275 ("The parties agree . . . that continuing state dependency
proceedings involving each of the plaintiffs are ongoing state proceedings for the
purposes of Middlesex analysis.") (citing J.B. v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1291 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that continuing jurisdiction of juvenile court and six month periodic
review hearings constitute ar, ongoing state judicial proceeding)).
130 31 Foster Childrcr, 329 F.3d at 1275.
'3' Id. at 1277 ("Whether the effect of the federal court injunctive relief the
plaintiffs seek in this lawsuit will interfere with ongoing state dependency proceedings
depends in part on the nature and extent of those proceedings.").
132 The Eleventh Circuit opinion gives a chronological outline of Florida's
foster care system along the same lines as the one which follows. See id. at 1277-78.
133 See FLA. STAT. ch. 409.145 (2003). Children can also be voluntarily placed
into foster care by their parents or guardians. Id.
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of children from their families; (b) reunification of families who
have had children placed in foster homes or institutions; (c)
permanent placement (i.e. adoption) of children who cannot be
reunited with their families or when reunification would not be
in the best interest of the child; and (d) protection of dependent
children or children alleged to be dependent, including
provision of emergency and long-term alternate living
arrangements. T3
A child is involuntarily brought into the foster care
system either by the Department or by law enforcement
officers.'35 Once brought in, the Department must immediately
consider whether probable cause exists to detain the child. 13 If
probable cause exists, the Department must conduct a shelter
hearing within 24 hours of removal of the child to retain
custody.'37 Next a determination of dependency is made. A child
is deemed dependent when he or she has been abused,
neglected, or abandoned, or suffers from or is in "imminent
danger of illness or injury as a result of abuse, neglect, or
abandonment."'38 If deemed necessary, the Department files a
petition for dependency against the parents or legal guardians
of the abused, neglected, or abandoned child.'39
Once that occurs, the Florida state juvenile court system
is given jurisdiction to proceed with determinations in the best
interest of the child.40 An adjudicatory hearing in the juvenile
court, with the purpose of either decreeing the child dependent
or returning the child to its home, must be held "as soon as
practicable after the petition for dependency is filed."'4' The
child is adjudicated dependent at this hearing if the facts
alleged in the dependency proceeding regarding the
abandonment, neglect, or abuse are found to be true.' The
court must follow-up within 30 days of the dependency
determination with a dispositional hearing.'43 At the child's
FLA. STAT. ch. 409.145(1) (2003).
... FLA. STAT. ch. 39.401(1)(b) (2003).).
'w FLA. STAT. ch. 39.401(3) (2003).
137 Id.
133 FLA. STAT. ch. 39.402(1)(a) (2003).
139 See FLA. STAT. ch. 39.401 (2003).
141 See FLA. STAT. ch. 39.507 (2003).
' FLA. STAT. ch. 39.507(1)(a) (2003).
14' FLA. STAT. ch. 39.521(1) (2003) ("A disposition hearing shall be conducted
by the court, if the court finds that the facts alleged in the petition for dependency were
proven in the adjudicatory hearing....").
143 FLA. STAT. ch. 39.507(7) (2003). ("At the conclusion of the adjudicatory
hearing, if the child named in the petition is found dependent, the court shall schedule
the disposition hearing within 30 days after the last day of the adjudicatory hearing.").
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dispositional hearing, the court resolves in whose custody the
child will remain.' Only after the court determines that it is
not in the best interest of the child's safety and well-being to be
placed with a parent, relative, or other non-licensed placement
will the court "commit the child into the temporary legal
custody of the department."145 The governing statute describes
this transfer of custody as follows:
Such commitment invests in the [D]epartment all rights and
responsibilities of a legal custodian. The [Dlepartment shall not
return any child to the physical care and custody of the person from
whom the child was removed, except for court-approved visitation
periods, without the approval of the court. The term of such
commitment continues until terminated by the court or until the
child reaches the age of 18.146
When a child is placed into legal custody of the
Department, a written case plan, which follows the child until
he or she leaves the system, is required to be submitted and
approved by the court.'47 Among other items, the case plan for a
child in state custody must include the following: a description
of the permanency goal for the child; a description of the type of
placement in which the child is placed; a description of the
visitation rights of the parents; a discussion of the safety and
appropriateness of the child's placement; a discussion of the
department's plans to carry out the judicial determination
made by the court; a description of the plan to facilitate either
the safe return of the child to the home or the permanent
placement of the child; and a description of the plan to address
the needs of the child. 148
While a child is in state custody, the state court
maintains continuing jurisdiction over the dependency case,
and the court reviews the status of the child in a dependency
'" See FLA. STAT. ch. 39.521 (2003).
1 FLA. STAT. ch. 39.521(3)(d) (2003).
146 Id.
"7 FLA. STAT. ch. 39.521(1)(a) (2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 39.601 (2003). The case
plan is defined as a document "prepared by the department with input from all parties.
The case plan follows the child from the provision of voluntary services through any
dependency, foster care, or termination of parental rights proceeding or related activity
or process." FLA. STAT. ch. 39.01(11) (2003).
18 See FLA. STAT. chs. 39.601(1)-(3) (2003) (providing an exhaustive list of all
required items in a child's case plan).
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proceeding at least once every six months.14 At a dependency
hearing, the court considers "the child's situation, including
whether there has been compliance with the case plan, the
appropriateness of the child's current placement, and whether
the child is in a setting that is family-like and consistent with
the child's best interests and special needs."5 ° The court
determines at a dependency hearing whether the child is to
remain in foster care, be returned to the parent or guardian, or
if termination of parental rights hearings should be initiated
against the parent to free the child for adoption. 5' Additionally,
if the court finds that the Department is not in compliance with
the case plan, it can hold the Department in contempt for its
failure to comply."1
2
It is this periodic dependency hearing (or review
hearing) that is at the heart of the abstention dispute in Bonnie
L. It is the "ongoing state court proceeding" over which the
Eleventh Circuit claims potential federal court interference
that runs afoul of Younger abstention."' In Bonnie L., the
Eleventh Circuit resolved that "the plaintiffs are seeking relief
that would interfere with the ongoing state dependency
proceedings by placing decisions that are now in the hands of
the state courts under the direction of the federal district
court."" 4 The court of appeals concluded that the declaratory
judgment and injunctions requested by plaintiffs could result
in impermissible interferences with state court adjudications
because the federal court and state court could issue
"conflicting orders about what is best for a particular plaintiff,
such as whether a particular placement is safe or appropriate
or whether sufficient efforts are being made to find an adoptive
family.""' The circuit court also concluded that the federal
court could "effectively require an amendment to a child's case
14' FLA. STAT. ch. 39.701(1)(a) (2003).
150 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003)
(referencing FLA. STAT. chs. 39.701(7)(d),(g) (2003)).
1 FLA. STAT. ch. 39.701(9)(a) (2003).
152 FLA. STAT. ch. 39.701(9)(c) (2003).
If, in the opinion of the court, the social service agency has not complied with
its obligations as specified in the written case plan, the court may find the
social service agency in contempt, shall order the social service agency to
submit its plans for compliance with the agreement, and shall require the
social service agency to show why the child could not be safely be returned to
the home of the parents.
Id.





plan that the state court would not have approved" when state
law gives the state courts authority to makes such
amendments.'56
Both of these conclusions are unsupported and
incorrect. The court did not explain how such interferences
would occur as a result of the declaratory and injunctive relief
sought in Bonnie L. The relief sought was aimed specifically at
the executive branch officials of Florida's Department of
Children and Families. It was not directed in any way against
the state court system, its procedures, the actions of its judges,
or the dependency proceedings conducted therein."7 The
plaintiffs sought a declaration that certain practices of the
Department were unconstitutional and unlawful; an injunction
against the Department to end continued constitutional
violations; remedial relief to ensure compliance with the
Constitution and laws of the United States; and the
appointment of a panel of experts to supervise the
implementation of a plan to reform the Department of Children
and Families.' In more concrete terms, the plaintiffs sought
relief such as increased funding for the Department, improved
training for Department employees and foster families, and
better supervision, visitation and monitoring of children in
foster care. None of this relief would affect the nature or
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, nor would it interfere with
dispositions made in that court with respect to individual
children in the foster care system.
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit made an egregious
mistake in its incorrect reading of the mission of the expert
panel that plaintiffs sought to have created. The court of
appeals asserted that the plaintiffs sought the appointment of
a panel "to implement a systemwide plan to revamp and reform
dependency proceedings in Florida."59 The directive of the
156 Id.
157 See id. at 1261-62 (outlining the relief sought).
1 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1261-62.
Id. at 1279. Plaintiffs sought panel rehearing of the Eleventh Circuit's
abstention ruling, in particular of the Court's reliance on an incorrect interpretation of
the nature and purpose of the proposed expert panel. The hearing was denied by
summary per curiam order. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *14, Reggie B. v. Bush,
540 U.S. 984 (2003) (No. 03-351), available at 2003 WL 22428949.
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panel was completely unrelated to dependency proceedings.
Rather, the panel's explicit objective was to develop and
oversee reform of the executive agency only. As the following
two sections detail, this mischaracterization is but one of many
errors made by the Eleventh Circuit in finding abstention
proper in Bonnie L. v. Bush.
B. Inappropriate Extension of the Younger Abstention
Doctrine
1. First Middlesex Prong: No Interference with State
Court Proceedings
It is in its analysis of the first Middlesex prong that the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals inappropriately extended
the scope of Younger abstention beyond its proscribed bounds.
The court relied on several cases to support its finding of
impermissible interference, none of which provide persuasive
justification for abstention. Most notably, the court relied on
the Tenth Circuit decision in Joseph A. v. Ingram.5 ° In that
case, factually analogous to Bonnie L., a class action civil rights
claim was filed in 1980 against New Mexico's child welfare
system on behalf of children in New Mexico's custody, alleging
systemic deficiencies in that state's foster care system in
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff foster
children."' A settlement was reached in the suit three years
after filing, with both parties agreeing to enter into a consent
decree.162 In 1999 plaintiffs brought a contempt proceeding in
federal district court against the defendant Department for
failure to comply with the decree. In response, the defendants
moved for dismissal on grounds of Younger abstention, which
the district court granted."' The Tenth Circuit vacated the
district court's Younger abstention dismissal, determining that
while some provisions of the consent decree may warrant
1"6 Joseph A. ex rel. Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2002). It should
be noted that the Tenth Circuit's first opinion, decided in August of 2001 and reported
at 262 F.3d 1113, was withdrawn and superseded on rehearing (in January 2002) by
the opinion cited infra.
'6' See Joseph A., 275 F.3d at 1257.
162 Id.
' Id. In 1988, the initial consent decree was vacated and replaced with a
second decree. The contempt proceeding brought in 1999 was actually for failure to
comply with the second decree. Id.
16 Id. The defendants also sought dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity, which the court rejected. Id.
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Younger abstention, not all necessarily do. 5' The Circuit Court
remanded the case, ordering that the district court conduct a
"provision-by-provision" analysis of the consent decree to
conclude which provisions, if any, run afoul of Younger.6 '
While the Tenth Circuit did not rule that any of the
consent decree provisions warranted Younger abstention, its
discussion of the possibility of abstention articulates an
inappropriate expansion of the doctrine. The court of appeals
conceded that the issue before it was dissimilar to most
abstention cases: "[Wie recognize that this is not the typical
Younger case in which a federal court is asked either to enjoin
an action from proceeding in state court, or to issue a
declaratory judgment that would have essentially the same
effect as an injunction."'67 The court, nonetheless, found that
Younger abstention would be applicable, noting that
"[e]nforcement of the [decree] . . . requires interference with the
operations of the Children's Court in an insidious way in that
the [decree] expressly prevents the Department's employees
from recommending a range of planning options for children
who are in the Department's custody."'68 The Tenth Circuit
admitted that this was not the type of interference Younger v.
Harris and its progeny contemplated, and yet refused to reject
the abstention argument. Instead the Court created a new type
of interference, which it deemed "insidious" interference, to
which Younger abstention would apply. The Court stated that
enforcement of the consent decree would have "an effect not
unlike that of an injunction or declaratory judgment."'69
In Bonnie L., the Eleventh Circuit looked to the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Joseph A. to support its own ruling. 170 Use
of the Joseph A. decision as support is misguided and inapt.
For one, the Joseph A. decision is based on an unwarranted
expansion of the abstention doctrine. Moreover, on remand, the
5 Id. at 1274.
Joseph A., 275 F.3d at 1272 (stating that although "one provision may not
be enforceable in light of Younger" . .. that "does not necessarily warrant voiding the
entire consent decree ... or dismissing the entire action") (internal citations omitted).
167 Id. at 1268 (internal citations omitted).
1'6 Id. (emphasis added).
Joseph A., 275 F.3d at 1268.
, See 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003).
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district court, instructed by the Tenth Circuit to do a provision-
specific analysis pursuant to the fictitious insidious
interference standard,' found that only one provision of the
entire consent decree called for Younger abstention. 72 In light
of the remand decision, the precedential value of Joseph A. is
extremely weak.'73
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit's finding of
interference with state court proceedings sufficient to satisfy
the first prong of the Middlesex test is discredited by the
Supreme Court's holding in NOPSI,'74 where the Supreme
Court explicitly restrained the expansion of Younger abstention
in the civil sphere.'7' The opinion states:
Although our concern for comity and federalism has led us to expand
the protection of Younger beyond state criminal prosecution, to civil
enforcement proceedings, and even to civil proceedings involving
certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts'
ability to perform their judicial functions, it has never been
suggested that Younger requires abstention in deference to a state
judicial proceeding reviewing legislative or executive action. Such a
broad abstention requirement would make a mockery of the rule that
only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court's refusal to
decide a case in deference to the States.
176
It is clear then that abstention is improper when the
state court proceeding reviews legislative or executive action.
The case of Bonnie L. falls squarely into this category. The suit
challenges wholly executive conduct, that of the Department of
Children and Families, and its inability to effectively run a
child welfare system in compliance with the U.S. Constitution.
The defendants in the suit are all executive officials and
administrators of an executive agency, 77 and the relief sought
is aimed directly at their actions and inactions.7 8
Furthermore, only three months after the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Bonnie L., the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, upon which the Eleventh Circuit
provides binding authority, rejected Younger abstention in a
171 See Joseph A., 275 F.3d at 1272-73.
'72 Joseph A. ex rel. Wolfe v. Ingram, No. CIV 80-623 JC/DJS (Jan. 16, 2003).
17 See, e.g., Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 287-88 (N.D. Ga.
2003) (distinguishing Bonnie L. and noting that, on remand, abstention was found
unwarranted in Joseph A.).
174 NOPSI, 491 U.S. 350 (1989); see supra text accompanying notes 119-25.
171 See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 367-69, 373.
'76 Id. at 367-68 (internal citations omitted).
'71 See 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003).
17' Id. at 1261-62.
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case factually analogous to Bonnie L. "9 In Kenny A. v. Perdue, a
plaintiff class consisting of all foster children residing in two of
Georgia's counties in the custody of the Georgia Department of
Human Resources brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action suit
seeking systemic reform of the two counties' child welfare
systems.8 ° As in Bonnie L., the plaintiffs alleged widespread
deficiencies in the system in violation of their constitutional
and federal statutory rights. 8' The district court found that the
relief sought did not implicate Younger concerns because it
would not interfere in any way with ongoing state court
proceedings.' The district court stated:
Although plaintiffs all have periodic reviews before the state juvenile
courts, the declaratory and injunctive relief plaintiffs seek is not
directed at their review hearings, or at Georgia's juvenile courts,
juvenile court judges, or juvenile court personnel. Rather, plaintiffs
seek relief directed solely at executive branch defendants to remedy
their alleged failures as plaintiffs custodians."
After detailing the alleged violations of the Georgia
child welfare department,'84 the court went on to proclaim that
if the allegations were proven to be true, "an order by this
Court remedying such failures would not interfere in any way
with ongoing juvenile court proceedings."" The court
determined, in fact, that "[tlo the contrary, the relief sought by
plaintiffs would at most simply support and further the
juvenile court's own mission of ensuring that children removed
179 Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
180 Id. at 283.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 285-86.
18 Id. at 286 (emphasis in original).
.. Kenny A., 218 F.R.D. at 286. The alleged failures include the following:
assignment of excessive caseloads to inadequately trained and poorly supervised
caseworkers; insufficient number of appropriately safe foster homes; lack of
identification of possible relative placements as alternative to stranger or institutional
placements; failure to provide sufficient support services to foster parents; failure to
implement adequate information management systems to ensure expeditious
placement of children in homes matching individual needs; failure to provide timely
and appropriate permanency planning; placement of children in unsafe, unsanitary,
and inappropriate shelters or placements; failure to prove mental, medical health, and
educational needs being met for children in state custody; and separation of teenage
mothers in foster care from their babies and siblings in foster care from one another
without adequate visitation. Id.
185 Id.
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from their parents' custody because of abuse or neglect are not
further harmed when the juvenile court orders them into the
custody of the state." "' For example, the court explained, the
"only conceivable effect" of reducing caseworkers' caseloads is
that caseworkers would be better prepared to appear in
juvenile court."'
The Kenny A. decision is especially informative because
of the manner in which the Georgia district court distinguished
the facts of Kenny A. from Bonnie L., and thereby avoided
following the Eleventh Circuit's decision to dismiss in Bonnie
L.'8 The district court, in Kenny A., determined that "the relief
requested in [Bonnie L.] went far beyond what [was] sought [in
Kenny A.]."" In reality, however, the relief sought was for the
most part exactly the same. The Northern District of Georgia's
proposition that Bonnie L. sought more far-reaching relief was
based entirely on the Eleventh Circuit's mischaracterization of
the relief sought in the Florida case."' The Georgia opinion
states: "As described by the court of appeals, plaintiffs in
[Bonnie L.] sought 'to have the district court appoint a panel
and give it authority to implement a systemwide plan to
revamp and reform dependency proceedings in Florida, as well
as the appointment of a permanent children's advocate to
oversee that plan.' ' . 1 However, as previously noted, the
plaintiffs in Bonnie L. did not seek to create a panel for the
purpose of revamping or reforming the dependency proceedings
in any way. The panel was meant to monitor reformation of the
executive agency controlling the child welfare system. The
Georgia district court also distinguished Kenny A. from Bonnie
L. by noting that the Eleventh Circuit found in Bonnie L. that
186 Id.
187 Id.
1 Younger abstention was ostensibly not applied in Kenny A. because the
defendants removed the case from state to federal court, and in so doing waived their
right to seek abstention.
In this case, however, State Defendants are in federal court only because of
their own decision to remove the case from state court. It would be
fundamentally unfair to permit State Defendants to argue that this Court
must abstain from hearing the case after they voluntarily brought the case
before this Court. To do so would permit defendants effectively to prevent
plaintiffs from pursuing their federal claims in any forum.
Kenny A., 218 F.R.D. at 285. Nonetheless, the court determined that even absent
defendants' waiver of the right to seek abstention, Younger abstention would be
unwarranted and would not apply in the case. Id. at 285-86.
1.. Id. at 287.
190 Id.




"'the federal and state courts could well differ, issuing
conflicting orders about what is best for a particular
plaintiff.' 192 The Georgia court asserted:
In this case . . . plaintiffs do not ask the Court to make
individualized determinations with respect to particular foster
children. Instead, they seek relief mandating, on a system-wide
basis, that State Defendants institute reforms to ensure that
deprived children's constitutional and statutory rights are not
violated. 93
Again, the Georgia district court's determinations are
based on mischaracterizations in Bonnie L. Plaintiffs in Bonnie
L. did not seek to have the court make any determinations
about individual foster children that could conflict with orders
in the child's dependency proceeding. The relief sought by
Florida's foster children in Bonnie L. was exactly the relief
described in the above quoted passage: systemic reform of the
state's institution to ensure that plaintiffs' rights would not be
violated."' Thus, the Georgia case of Kenny A. is effectively
indistinguishable from Bonnie L., illustrating that, on the
merits, abstention was likewise not warranted in Bonnie L.
because there was no interference with state court proceedings.
The Eleventh Circuit's finding of interference
necessitating Younger abstention in Bonnie L. is also plainly
inconsistent with the prior cases in which the U.S. Supreme
Court has applied the doctrine. A survey of those cases reveals
that Younger abstention has been limited to scenarios where
the relief sought is the enjoinment of specific actions of state
court judges, prosecutors, and other law enforcement officials,
or the enjoinment of a specific proceeding from going forward.9
192 Kenny A, 218 F.R.D. at 288 (citing 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1278).
193 Id.
194 See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
195 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *18, Reggie B. v. Bush, 540 U.S. 984
(2003) (No. 03-351), available at 2003 WL 22428949 (noting that "every case in which
[the Supreme Court] has applied Younger has involved remedies that would have the
effect of putting a halt to state court proceedings"). In support of this proposition, the
plaintiffs' petition for certiorari cites the following cases: Trainor v. Hernandez, 431
U.S. 434, 438 (1977) (enjoining clerks and sheriffs from issuing or serving
attachments); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 330 (1977) (enjoining state court judges
from enforcement of contempt proceedings); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
924 (1975) (granting injunction of town attorney and other law enforcement officials);
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 345 (1975) (enjoining district attorneys and law
[Vol. 70:2
DISMISSING THE FOSTER CHILDREN
In all cases, the effective outcome of the relief sought was to
immobilize a state court proceeding.9 ' In the case of Bonnie L.,
the relief sought would have had no affect whatsoever on the
state court proceedings, the enforcement of judgments in those
proceedings, or the continuance of those proceedings. The relief
sought in Bonnie L. does not target juvenile court decisions
regarding individual children or seek changes to the case plans
of those children.'97 Instead the suit seeks systemic reform of
the child welfare agency itself, including an increase in the
number of caseworkers employed by the agency to decrease the
number of cases assigned to each worker; more and better
training of caseworkers; recruitment of additional foster homes
to serve as placements for foster children; and increased state
supervision and control over contract agencies with whom the
Department partners to provide foster case service.9 Thus, the
enforcement personnel and declaring the unconstitutionality of obscenity statute in
criminal proceeding); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 119 (1975) (enjoining attorney
general from proceeding with criminal prosecution); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592, 598-99 (1975) (enjoining sheriff and prosecuting attorney and execution of
judgment); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 492 (1974) (seeking to enjoin state court
judges and law enforcement officials from taking certain actions in future criminal
prosecutions); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 83-84 (1971) (entering suppression order
requiring return by law enforcement officials of materials); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S.
77, 78-79 (1971) (enjoining state court judges and state attorneys from prosecution of
intimidation statutes); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 67-68 (1971) (seeking to enjoin
district attorney from proceeding with criminal case and to declare statute underlying
prosecution unconstitutional); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 38-39, 53-54 (enjoining
district attorney from proceeding with criminal case). Certiorari Petition at *19 n.17,
Reggie B., (No.03-351).
1" Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *18-19, Reggie B. v. Bush, 540 U.S. 984
(2003) (No. 03-351), available at 2003 WL 22428949. The plaintiffs' petition also
distinguishes the remaining four of the Supreme Court's fifteen affirmative
applications of Younger abstention. The petition asserts that, notwithstanding the fact
that the relief sought in those four cases was directed at "administrative bodies,
executive agency officials, and even private litigants," it was nonetheless sought to
"enjoin the state proceedings themselves or to enjoin a litigant from instituting or
continuing with such proceedings." Id. The petition cites the following cases in support:
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 8 (1987) (enjoining attempts to enforce state
court judgment or obtain lien under state law); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton
Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 624-25 (1986) (enjoining civil rights commission
from exercising jurisdiction over sex discrimination claim); Middlesex County Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 429 (1982) (seeking to enjoin state
attorney disciplinary proceeding); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 422 (1979) (enjoining
juvenile court neglect and abuse proceeding). Certiorari Petition at *19 n.18, Reggie B.,
(No. 03-351).
'97 See 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1261-62.
1'8 See Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, No. 00-2116, 2001 WL 1840843, at
*7-9 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2001) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge)
(outlining plaintiffs twenty specific allegations of defendants' practices resulting in
plaintiffs' violations of rights, as stated in plaintiffs' amended complaint), motions
granted, 1180 F. Supp. 2d. 1231 (S.D. Fla. 2001), affd in part, vacated in part sub nom.
31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 540 U.S. 984
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relief sought in the federal suit in no way implicates Younger
abstention, and the Eleventh Circuit's application of Younger
abstention is an impermissible extension of the doctrine.
2. Third Middlesex Prong Not Satisfied: No
Opportunity for Relief in State Court Proceeding
The Eleventh Circuit was also incorrect in its
determination that plaintiff had an adequate opportunity in
the state court proceeding to raise his constitutional
challenges,'99  thereby satisfying the third factor in the
Middlesex test."' The plaintiffs in Bonnie L. did not have such
an opportunity in their juvenile court dependency
proceedings." 1 To begin, it is clear from statutory and case law
that Florida's Juvenile Courts do not have the authority to
implement system-wide reform of Florida's Department of
Children and Families. There is no provision in Florida's Rules
of Juvenile Procedure for bringing class action suits in a foster
child's periodic dependency hearing.22 The committee notes
accompanying the rules unambiguously state that "the rules
governing dependency and termination of parental rights
proceedings are self-contained and no longer need to reference
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure."2 3 Moreover, the Florida
District Court of Appeals has held that "[t]he courts are not
given general supervisory power over [the Department] under
the statutes."2 4
(2003).
19 See 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1281-82.
Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432.
See, e.g., LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1323 (D.C. Cir
1993).
There are three types of Family Division proceedings that may be 'pending'
for a child entangled in the District of Columbia's foster-care system: (1) a
"neglect proceeding" adjudicating a neglect petition filed by the Corporation
Counsel against the child's parents, (2) periodic review hearings, and (3)
proceedings adjudicating motions to terminate parental rights. None of these
proceedings is an appropriate forum for this multi-faceted class-action
challenge to the District of Columbia's administration of its entire foster-care
system.
Id.
'2 See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.000-8.735.
"' FL. R. Juv. P. 8.000, Committee Note to 1992 Amendment.
In re K.A.B., 483 So. 2d 898, 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
[Vol. 70:2
DISMISSING THE FOSTER CHILDREN
In limited instances, the Juvenile Court may hold the
Department in contempt for its failure to comply with a child's
case plan."5 However, the court has been found to have "no
general jurisdiction over DCF to monitor and evaluate its
functioning."2"6 In particular, for example, the court does not
have jurisdiction to order specific placement or specific
treatment for a child in the custody of the Department.2 7
Furthermore, the state courts do not have authority to
implement reform with respect to the number of caseworkers
employed by the Department, and thus the number of cases
each caseworker covers. 2 ' Nor is the court able to shut down or
prohibit the use of a shelter found to be unsafe or unfit for
foster children."9 In sum, the juvenile court is empowered only
to provide limited, individualized relief for a specific child in its
jurisdiction. The court has no authority to initiate systemic
the juvenile court does not have the authority to declare precisely where a dependant
child in the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services can be
placed); see also Florida Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs., Division of Youth Servs. v.
Crowell, 327 So. 2d 115, 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) ("Nowhere in [the governing
Florida] statutes do we find that the court has been given general supervisory
authority over the day-to-day operations of Division of Youth Services in the
administration of the powers and duties conferred upon it.").
See FLA. STAT. ch. 39.701(8)(c) (2003).
2" Dep't of Children and Family Servs. v. I.C., 742 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (holding that juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to enter an
injunction preventing DCF from housing disabled children who have been rejected from
placements at an assessment center).
1o7 See, e.g., State, ex rel. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Nourse,
437 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("[T]he court does not have the
jurisdiction to manage the details of how [the Department] will attempt to rehabilitate
juveniles."); Henry & Rilla white Found., Inc., v. Migdal, 720 So. 2d 568, 572 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) ("a court may not require a child committed to the department to be
placed in a specific facility"). But see In re L.W., 615 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that the Department could order placement in a therapeutic foster home
or residential treatment center and distinguishing Nourse on the grounds that the
child in that case was a delinquent, and not a dependant); State Dep't of Health and
Rehabilitative Servs. v. Brooke, 573 So. 2d 363, 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that circuit court did "not facially interfere with the Department's executive discretion
concerning the placement of dependent children in derogation of the doctrine of
separation of powers by ordering the children to be placed in specific [therapeutic]
institutions").
20. See Lee v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 698 So. 2d 1194, 1197
(Fla. 1997) ("[Tlhe function of interpreting and implementing the rules governing the
number and assignment of employees to supervise and care for the mentally disabled. .
. is a discretionary policy-making function for which [the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services] cannot be held liable because those types of decisions are
sovereignly immune.").
.09 See Dep't of Children and Family Servs. v. I.C., 742 So. 2d 401, 405 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also Henry & Rilla White Found., Inc., 720 So. 2d at 568
(finding that trial court has authority to investigate and consider safety concerns
arising from placement of a child in a particular facility, but not holding that the trial
court can shut down an unsafe facility).
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reform of the Department's conduct because such actions are
deemed "executive agency decisions which implicate policy
development and prioritizing of funding," and are thus outside
of the scope of the juvenile court's jurisdiction. 1°
The Supreme Court has determined that, in abstention
analysis, the federal court plaintiff must provide "unambiguous
authority" that the state-court proceedings fail to afford an
adequate remedy.21' In Bonnie L., the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
that "in determining whether the state remedies are adequate.
• . '[t]he relevant question is not whether the state courts can
do all that Plaintiffs wish they could, but whether the available
remedies are sufficient to meet [the] requirement that the
remedy be adequate.' 212  As discussed in the preceding
paragraph, the juvenile court is not able to provide an adequate
remedy to the plaintiffs. Florida's foster care system is severely
deficient, and its deficiencies put children at risk.23 The
adequate remedies are what plaintiffs in Bonnie L. sought,
among them increased funding and the creation of a panel of
child welfare experts to develop and oversee institutional
reform of the entire troubled system, a remedy that the
juvenile court cannot provide.214
The juvenile court is further restrained by the fact that
the Department is guaranteed the absolute defense of
inadequate resources in a juvenile court proceeding.1 5
210 See Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 742 So. 2d at 404.
211 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) ("[Wlhen a litigant has
not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal
court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the
absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.").
212 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Bonnie L. v. Bush, 180 F.
Supp. 2d 1321, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2001)).
213 See supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
21 Similar panels of experts to oversee reform were created pursuant to
consent decrees arising from settlements in cases analogous to Bonnie L. brought on
behalf of foster children in New York and New Jersey (with plaintiffs represented by
the same advocacy group as plaintiffs in Bonnie L.). See Michelle Han, DYFS Panel
Gets Broad Powers, THE RECORD (New Jersey), June 25, 2003, at Al; Leslie Brody, New
York Panel is Model for DYFS Reforms: Commitment Necessary For Change, Experts
Say, THE RECORD (New Jersey), June 25, 2003, at A12.
215 See, e.g., Dep't of Children and Families v. J.H., 831 So. 2d 782, 783 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the Circuit Court could not require DCF to provide
funding for therapy and evaluations for a dependent child, and noting that "the court's
order ignores DCF's funding issues"); Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. V.L., 583 So.
2d 765, 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the Department was not required to
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Statutory law provides that the Department of Children and
Families shall establish and supervise a foster care program
"within funds appropriated."2 16 The Florida Appellate Court
itself has articulated this inherent limitation. In the case of In
re L. W.,217 the court explained:
The Legislature has imposed a daunting responsibility on the
Department to provide for the needs of the children of this state but
apparently has not provided the funds necessary to accomplish the
task. On the other hand, it has given the courts the duty to review
the actions of the Department to assure the protection of the minor
child, but the absence of needed funds has limited the trial court's
ability to assure the protection of the child's rights and welfare. The
losers in all this are the children like L.W.2
18
The Eleventh Circuit noted in Bonnie L. that one reason
behind plaintiffs' failure to establish an inadequate remedy in
the ongoing state court proceedings was the Florida juvenile
court's contempt power in the face of Department non-
compliance with an individual child's case plan.219 However,
this touted contempt power is effectively futile when the
Department can plead inadequate funding in its defense. To
implement the type of institutional reform plaintiffs in Bonnie
L. sought requires the expenditure of funds to finance efforts
such as hiring more caseworkers and providing improved
training for caseworkers and foster families. 220 Indeed, in late
2003, the Secretary of Florida's Department of Children and
Families requested from the State Legislature an increase of
$474 million in the Department's budget to initiate effective
reform of the system.221' The Department received less than
twenty-five percent of that figure.22 Assuming, arguendo, that
the Florida Juvenile Court would even have jurisdiction to
place a dependent child in psychiatric facility until funds were available to do so and
that "the legislature's appropriations power is ... off limits to the courts").
216 FLA. STAT. CH. 409.165 (2003).
217 In re L.W., 615 So. 2d 834 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
... Id. at 839.
219 See 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1281.
220 The recent settlement in the District Court of New Jersey of the Charlie &
Nadine H. v. McGreevey class action suit illustrates the need for additional funding in
the implementation of system-wide reform of state child welfare systems. Under the
settlement terms of that case, brought against New Jersey's Division of Youth and
Family Services (DYFS) on behalf of foster children in New Jersey's custody, the State
was ordered to appropriate an additional $23.85 million for DYFS's fiscal year 2004
budget. See Michael Booth, DYFS Monitoring, Additional Funding End Suit Alleging
Shoddy Foster Care, 172 N.J.L.J. 1213 (June 30, 2003).




order improvements of Florida's child welfare system, those
improvements would likely never come about as the court
orders would be unenforceable given the Department's defense
of inadequate resources.
The federal courts, on the other hand, are not
constrained by funding concerns when granting injunctive
relief to remedy constitutional violations.223 Even if the
remedial scheme requires additional funding, federal court
orders are fully enforceable. Thus, for all the reasons discussed,
the federal courts are the only forum which can provide the
plaintiffs in Bonnie L. with an adequate remedy for their
constitutional violations. The Eleventh Circuit's ruling in favor
of abstention, therefore, is misguided as the third Middlesex
factor was not satisfied.
V. FEDERAL COURTS' RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF FOSTER CHILDREN
The Supreme Court has explicitly affirmed the federal
courts' duty to protect citizens from constitutional violations
committed at the hands of the State: "The very purpose of
Section 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the
States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action
under color of state law. ,,224 The Eleventh Circuit's decision
to abstain in Bonnie L. has closed the doors of federal
courthouses to a class of children deeply in need of the Court's
protections. As one author has put it:
It is difficult to imagine a more powerless group of people than foster
children. They are largely unrepresented in the court proceedings
that lead to their placements. Living without the protection of their
parents, they are completely at the mercy of the persons who may
also be responsible for maltreating them. They do not vote; they lack
See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 90 (1989)
("equitable relief-even 'a remedy that might require the expenditure of state funds'--
may be awarded to ensure future compliance by a State with a substantive federal
question determination") (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 282 (1986)); Antrican
v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 185 (4th Cir. 2002) ("simply because the implementation of
such prospective relief would require the expenditure of substantial sums of money
does not remove a claim from the Ex Parte Young exception").
2" Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
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the developmental ability to organize. Their voices, assuming they
are old enough to speak, cannot be heard. "5
In addition to the inherent helplessness of foster
children, many foster care systems in this country, Florida
among them, are clearly not succeeding at the job of protecting
children.226 According to a recent study, "national data on child
abuse fatalities show that a child is more than twice as likely to
die of abuse in foster care than in the general population."22 '
And because the number of children in foster care in this
country has more than doubled since 1982 (to over half a
million children), the rate of abuse in foster care has "increased
dramatically over the last 30 years.228 The following passage
depicts several of the major shortcomings of current foster care
systems:
As foster care agencies scramble to find more homes for the influx of
children, they cut corners and certify foster parents who should not
be permitted to care for children. They place children with families
who cannot meet their needs, and fail to supervise the children once
they are placed in homes.
Other agency deficiencies include failure to recruit a broad range
and higher number of foster placements, not having an accurate
system for tracking past allegations of abuse and not hiring and
training qualified workers who are able to screen homes and monitor
children. As a result, some children are sent to live with abusive
foster parents, and the abuse may continue unheeded by
caseworkers whose caseloads are far too heavy.229
The need for reform of child welfare agencies is evident.
How to achieve successful reform, however, is a difficult
question without an easy answer.3 ° What is known is that
federal courts are the proper forum for attempting to do so.
2 '1
Filing a suit seeking redress and reform of a state foster care
agency in state court, as opposed to federal court, has several
21 See Mushlin, supra note 126, at 214 (internal citations omitted).
226 See supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
' Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales from the Age of ASFA, 36
NEW. ENG. L. REv. 129, 137 (2001) (citing U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services,
Administration on Children, Youth and Families, Child Maltreatment 1999 viii, 41
(2001)).
228 Kubitschek, supra note 18, at 42.
' Id. (internal citations omitted).
'30 For a general discussion of past cases seeking to reform child welfare
systems and the inconsistency among courts with respect to defining the legal rights of
children in state custody, see Arlene E. Fried, The Foster Child's Avenue of Redress:
Questions Left Unanswered, 26 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 465 (1993).
231 See Mushlin, supra note 126, at 256-58.
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critical disadvantages.232 The palpable drawbacks of suing in
state court combine with a substantial preference in foster care
reform litigation to seek injunctive relief, as opposed to
damages, to make federal courts the only appropriate forum."'
One major disadvantage to bringing a suit such as
Bonnie L. in state court is the barrier that can be imposed by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In states recognizing the
doctrine, foster children will be barred from bringing any state
tort claim.24 Another disadvantage to suit in state court is the
necessity of overcoming state laws that seal the records of
foster children; every state has legislation that makes foster
care records confidential. 235 Although the purpose underlying
these confidentiality laws is protection of the child's privacy,
the laws allow foster care agencies to evade accountability for
their actions.236 In contrast, a civil rights suit filed in federal
court avoids these obstacles. For one, sovereign immunity and
other state law immunity claims would not apply to a claim
brought against a state child welfare agency under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.27 In addition, confidentiality would not be a concern in a
federal civil rights action because federal law would govern
confidentiality and trump state privilege statutes.23 Federal
courts' liberal discovery rules would mandate disclosure of all
219records kept by the agency.
2 See, e.g., Kubitschek, supra note 18, at 42 ("Abused foster children ...
already have three strikes against them when they seek redress in state court: state
immunity, no adults to sue on their behalf, and sealed records."); Mushlin, supra note
126, at 256 ("[State courts] lack the institutional attributes necessary to overcome the
bureaucratic and political obstacles to the achievement of a safe foster care system.").
23 See Scott J. Preston, Casenote, "Can You Hear Me?". The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Addresses the Systemic Deficiencies of the
Philadelphia Child Welfare System in Baby Neal v. Casey, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1653,
1706 (1996) ("Structural injunctions, by their very nature, are the appropriate
mechanism to guarantee [child welfare] reform"); Mushlin, supra note 126, at 250
("Individual damage actions, even if available, are not useful mechanisms for obtaining
reform.").
. See Kubitschek, supra note 18, at 42; Mushlin, supra note 126, at 245-46;
Karoline S. Homer, Note, Program Abuse and Foster Care: A Search for Solutions, 1
VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 177, 218-19 (1993).
' See Kubitschek, supra note 18, at 42
2. See id. at 42-43.
27 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376 (1990); see also Kubitschek, supra note
18, at 43.
' See Kubitschek, supra note 18, at 46.
.. See id.
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The federal system is also preferable to the state system
in a case seeking institutional reform of a major state agency,
such as child welfare, because the lifetime appointment of
federal court judges insulates them from pressures that could
adversely affect the attainment of effective reform.4 ° State
court judges are elected officials and therefore subject to
political pressure, and their "lack of electoral independence"
can "dilute their ability to order and supervise reform of state
institutions, such as the foster care system."241
The other major component of the argument in favor of
federal courts presiding over suits on behalf of foster children,
such as Bonnie L., is the preference for injunctive relief over
damages. The major drawback to a damage action is its
inability to bring about systemic reform of failing systems on
an institutional level.242 A damage action addresses the needs of
a single child, and in so doing overlooks the "root causes" of the
problem from a broader perspective, i.e. the inadequate
funding, staffing, and monitoring of child welfare systems.243
One scholar has aptly described the ineffectiveness of damages
actions in achieving system-wide foster care reform as follows:
Child welfare agencies often are inadequately funded, and as a
result, violations of federal foster care law often are not caused by
recalcitrance, but rather by limited resources. Although permanency
planning is the undisputed goal of foster care, achieving a
permanent plan for each child is a highly resource-intensive task.
Under such conditions, the utility of a damages remedy as the
linchpin of reform is questionable, since successful judgments simply
diminish the already scarce resources of child welfare agencies.
Agencies found liable for damages will be forced to concentrate their
resources on remedying the particular problem that created the
liability rather than on the more fundamental problems affecting the
child welfare system. Finally, when faced with known funding
limitations, judges often will be unwilling to compensate just one
24 See Mushlin, supra note 126, at 256-57 ("Article III requirement of lifetime
appointment for federal judges . . .largely insulates the federal judiciary from the
political process, giving federal judges the level of independence needed to counter the
majoritarian tendencies-expressed through elected officials-to tolerate a
substandard system of foster care.") (internal citations omitted).
241 Id.
"' See Marcia Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980s: Child Welfare Impact
Litigation After the Warren Years, 20 FAM. L.Q. 255, 266-67 (1986) ("[T]here is a real
question about whether [damage actions] have any real impact on an operating system.
. . . [Tiheir utility, beyond redressing the harm to a particular plaintiff, is
questionable.").
3 See Mushlin, supra note 126, at 250.
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child when many others have been injured or will be injured in the
future.'
Damage actions allow courts to avoid dealing with the
widespread deficiencies of child welfare systems, the
deficiencies which cause harm to individual children within the
system.
In light of the inadequacy of suits seeking damages, a
federally enforceable injunction is a "more promising catalyst
for foster care reform."" In particular, the "structural
injunction" is the most appropriate remedy to bring about
reform of troubled foster care systems.246  A structural
injunction, by definition, "seeks to effectuate the reformation of
policies or practices of an ongoing social institution."247 It is "a
court's remedial tool to reform an entire state institution in
order to bring it into compliance with the Constitution" and it
"requires a judge to maintain an ongoing relationship with the
institution as she supervises its reconstruction."248 To improve
failing child welfare systems and protect foster children from
abuse and neglect, states must be forced, among other things,
to appropriate more funding to embattled systems, provide
better training to caseworkers and foster families, ensure
closer monitoring of children placed in state custody, and
decrease caseloads of caseworkers to guarantee adequate
supervision. The structural injunction is the tool that can best
accomplish these goals. It is the best way to proactively prevent
harm, abuse, and neglect from occurring within the foster care
system in the first place. 49
Federal courts must, therefore, take it upon themselves
to fulfill the duty and jurisdiction bestowed upon them and to
Homer, supra note 234, at 217-18 (internal citations omitted); see also
Lowry, supra note 242, at 267.
"' Homer, supra note 234, at 222.
241 See Preston, supra note 233, at 1706. Preston traces the introduction of the
"structural injunction" to the injunction issued by the Supreme Court in 1955 in the
case of Brown v. Board of Education, noting that "tlhereafter, the Supreme Court
began to uphold other forms of public law litigation aimed at remedying constitutional
violations at various state funded institutions." Id. at 1687.
.47 Id. at 1688.
48 Rodger Citron, Note, (Un)Lucky v. Miller: The Case for a Structural
Injunction to Improve Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481,497 (1991).
29 Mushlin, supra note 126, at 250.
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protect the constitutional rights of foster children by hearing
cases such as Bonnie L. In hiding behind a misguided
interpretation of the Younger abstention doctrine, the Eleventh
Circuit has passed this obligation to the state courts of Florida,
a forum which is not equipped procedurally or practically to
grant the relief required. The Eleventh Circuit, like the
beleaguered Florida Department of Children and Families, has
failed the foster children of Florida. The federal courts should
be the greatest ally of these vulnerable children in making the
state of Florida live up to its obligation to provide foster
children with the protection and care they are entitled to and
desperately need; instead the Eleventh Circuit has chosen to
abandon them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Florida's Department of Children and Families is not
alone in its failure to provide adequate care for children in its
custody. In a recent audit of thirty-two states' foster care
systems, in which each state system was measured against a
national standard in seven categories, no state passed in more
than two areas.25 ° The problems that state child welfare
agencies face are no secret: insufficient resources, inadequate
number of foster homes and facilities, improper training and
support, high turnover of caseworkers, and unmanageably high
caseloads. These problems have been around for decades and
continue to persist today. And yet, the deplorable state of foster
care seems to only capture the attention of politicians and the
general public after the horrible, gruesome, preventable death
of a child in foster care.2 5 '
Children languishing in foster care need the protection
of the courts. When the Eleventh Circuit abstained from
adjudicating Bonnie L. v. Bush, it not only deserted Florida's
foster children, it also set a dangerous precedent that could
Meckler, supra note 23.
"' A recent example of this was the January 2003 death of Faheem Williams,
a New Jersey child found starved, decomposed, and dead in a garbage bin in the
basement of his Newark home, along with his two brothers who were alive but severely
starved. The New Jersey system had closed its investigation of the Williams' home
despite open allegations of abuse. See Michael Powell & Christine Haughney, Kids in
N.J.'s Care Missing; 110 in Abuse Cases Unaccounted For as Files Are Checked, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 11, 2003, at As; Richard Wexler, Don't Rush to Foster Care,
THE STAR-LEDGER, Jan. 12, 2003. The tragic death spurred the State of New Jersey to
settle a class action suit filed against its Division of Youth and Family Services four
years prior to Williams' death.
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have a widespread effect on the half a million children in foster
care in the United States today. The decision to abstain in
Bonnie L. was improper. As this Note has attempted to show,
the Younger abstention doctrine does not provide just cause for
abstention in this case. The relief sought would not interfere
with juvenile court dependency proceedings, and the plaintiff
foster children cannot seek the relief they need and ought to be
given in the state court forum. Moreover, federal courts have
an obligation to vindicate federal constitutional violations. As
Chief Justice Marshall put it in 1821, "[T]o decline the exercise
of jurisdiction which is given . . .would be treason to the
constitution."52 The Eleventh Circuit's affirmation of the
District Court's decision not to hear this case and not to protect
abused and neglected children in Florida and throughout the
country was just that.
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